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CHAPTER 1, INTRODUCTION 
1,1. HISTORICAL ROOTS 
1.1,1. Tribal Beginnings. 
The broad pattern of change in Africa in the 
past.century is perhaps familiar. The usual point of 
departure, the tribal society, was, though highly 
sophisticated in its elaboration of relationships 
between people, vulnerable in the relationship between 
people and environment on which livelihood depends. 
The arsenal of technologies for manipulating the 
environment was small, so that many of the environmental 
vicitudes which impinge upon well-being could not be 
controlled. The pantheons of Gods and spirits, as well 
as the important role of magic and witchcraft, attest 
to the uncertainties of tribal existence. 
The relatively low level of technology implied 
that only small surplusses could be generated, so that 
most members of the tribal society.had to engage in 
subsistence activities, while only few could specialise 
in trades and crafts. The low ceiling of well-being 
dictated by the level of technology meant that even 
those, powerful enough to collect whatever surplus was 
generated, could use that wealth only to buy. allegiance 
and services and not to buy freedom from the hardships 
and -uncertainties faced by the common man. Meanwhile, 
fiercely demooratic traditions mitigated against the 
emergence of a landed gentry and other elites. 
The resultant of such forces was a very 
egalitarian society, further equalised by an elaborate 
system of mutual obligation and aid between clansmen 
and members of the extended family. The similarity 
in lifestyles within the tribal society was, in fact, 
so great that early anthropologists had no need for 
statistics. One could describe the house, the food, 
the drefes, etc., which characterised all members of 
the tribal society. 
See for instance, J. Kenyatta, 1938, p 81-83, on 
the Kikuyu house 
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Meanwhile, technological change was slow, so that there 
was ample time for beneficial technologies to spread 
to all, without disrupting the egalitarian structure. 
The relative abundance of land made labour 
the scarce resource, especially in East Africa where 
the major tribes had only settled a few hundred years 
ago and were still in the process of expanding their 
front! ers. But then, very strenuous labour on 
subsistence crops was only required during certain peak 
periods, leaving much time to maintain the elaborate 
social structure. Thus underutilised land and labour 
resources were, as we shall see later, an important 
feature of the tribal society. 
1,1,2. The Colonial Period. 
It was this egalitarian tribal society which 
became part of Europe's periphery. After an initial 
period of disruptive trade in slaves, ivory, gold, gin 
and guns, the situation was formalised by the Treaty 
of Berlin in 1885 which allotted Africa to the colonial 
powers without regard for tribal boundaries. The Treaty 
initiates a 70-year period of colonial rule with only 
few changes, such as the birthday gift of Queen Victoria 
to Kaiser Wilhelm, Mount Kilimanjaro, and the subsequent 
depossession of the Germans of their African territories 
after the Fi-rst World War. 
The impact of Colonial Rule on the tribal 
society was immense and varied. For our purposes, mention 
of only a few of the main effects suffices. 
Most important was, perhaps, the introduction 
of money, both in terms of generating a need for it 
and in terms of introducing methods for obtaining it. 
The need for money was generated, not only by introducing 
taxes, which forced people to sell surplusses, but 
especially by the demonstration effect of the products-•• 
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of the sophisticated European technology which created 
a strong desire for cotton dressed (many so—called 
traditional dresses still reflect.Victorian styles), 
iron sheeted roofs, methods of transportation, medical 
services, steel cutlasses, etc. The introduction of 
European technology implied a discontinuity in the 
gradual evolution of African technology and destroyed 
much indigenous initiative, (Roalney, 1972, p 114). 
The introduction of methods for making money 
depended upon the co-incidence of Europe's need for 
agricultural products which required a tropical climate, 
such as cocoa, spices, rubber, palm-oil, coffee, sugar, 
etc., on the one hand, and the existence of the under-
utilised labour and land resources in the tribal society 
on the other. Soon after the formalisation of the 
Colonial structure, Africa's hinterland was linked to 
convenient ports by a network of railroads, which 
allowed the evacuation of the agricultural products 
needed by Europe's markets. 
Sometimes, the effects of the new need for 
money preceded the efforts of the colonial power to 
supply its home market, as in case of Western Nigeria 
where cocoa spread very rapidly without the help of a 
single extension worker and before a good transportation 
network allowed evacuation of the produce to Lagos. 
In fact, Yoruba elders can still tell of the times 
when people would trek for days to carry a few kilos 
of cocoa beans to the nearest produce buyer. 
In other cases, the colonial power tried to 
promote the production of "cash crops" in places where 
a sufficient need for:jnomey had not yet been generated, 
leading to the temporary phenomenon of the "backward 
sloping supply curve", the economic model for a 
situation in which people have a target income 
so that they supply less if the price of their product 
rises. 
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Whatever came first, the colonialist's need 
for tropical produce or the tribal man's need for cash, 
the ultimate effect was the addition of a cashcrop to 
the tribal subsistence farm, a cashcrop which utilised 
the surplus of land and labour available and therefore 
did not greatly affect the system of subsistence farming 
itself. In some cases, as in Kenya and Rhodesia, where 
climate and natural environment compared favourably 
with Europe, white settlers started to produce the cash 
crop. In such places, the need for money generated 
among the Africans soon necessitated prohibition 
of African production of cashcrops, such as coffee. 
Thus Africa was effectively incorporated in 
the periphery of Europe and made completely dependent 
upon the European market for its monetary economy. 
Large quantities of cash crops were produced at a low 
price, but total demand for industrial goods remained 
low. Even today, the combined demand for industrial 
goods of Kenya, and Uganda does not exceed that of 
Manchester, England. 
The administration of taxation, law-and-order 
and cashcrop production required a bureaucratic structure 
to maintain it. The higher echelons of this civil 
service were, of course, filled by Europeans. The lower 
echelons, the policemen, chiefs, extension workers, 
clerks, etc., and the supportive services of house-
servants, messengers, drivers, etc., were filled by 
Africans. The administration's need for skilled labour, 
shops and special services was usually filled by non- . 
autochtonous groups, such as the Asians in East Africa 
and the Lebanese, Greeks and sometimes ex-slaves, in 
West and Central Africa0 Only when the colonising power 
was poor itself, such as in case of Portugal or Italy, 
did citizens of the colonial power provide such services. 
The administrative structure required money 
to maintain itself. Since the cashcrops were the only 
source of money, apart from mining in a few areas, an , 
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essential feature of the colonial system was the 
taxation of the cashcrop. Elaborate Marketing Boards 
with the monopoly of buying and exporting produce, were 
usually created and allowed the concentration of sufficient 
surplus to permit an upper-class European lifestyle 
for the Colonial Administration. 
1,1,3. Towards Independence 
The system was not foolproof. The seeds for 
.its destruction were present from the start. We have 
seen that the tribal society needed a Pantheon of Gods 
and spirits to account for those events which could not 
be controlled by indigenous technology. It soon became 
evident to the African that European technology could 
fill much of this vacuum. Besides, the European technology 
demonstrated beneficial outcomes, such as cotton dresses, 
which were hitherto unknown to tribal society. 
The result of such processes was the rapid spread 
of desires to benefit from the new technology. The small 
enclave's of wealth in the colonial capitals did thus not 
exist in splendid isolation. They had a profound effect 
on the tribal society by making it poor by comparison, 
that is, by generating a gap between African desires 
and outcomes. This gap motivated the tribal society to 
tremendous efforts to improve its outcomes. 
We already saw how these efforts led to the 
very rapid diffusion of cash crops. But the efforts 
made themselves felt on two other significant fronts 
as well. In the first place, the new poverty unleashed 
equalising forces seeking the distribution and leveling 
of the accumulations of wealth in the colonial enclaves. 
The emergence of these forces becomes evident if one 
compares Countess Blixen's description of her Kenyan 
paradise, where doors and windows could be left open 
at all times, with present-day Kenya where the rich 
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have to protect themselves with thiefwire, burglar 
alarms, fierce dogs and the services of the mush-
rooming private protection companies. 
In the second place, the desire for education 
as a means of advancement spread rapidly. At first 
people resisted it. Stories tell of chiefs who sent 
slaves to school instead of their own children, much 
to their regret when those., slaves were later placed 
in positions senior to them or cheated them in landcases. 
An Ibo elder told one of the authors with similar 
regret how his ability to outrun the chief's assistant 
accounted for his present illiteracy. 
But the initial resistance to schooling soon 
changed to wholehearted acceptance when it became 
obvous that schooling opened ifche doors to initially 
junior, but later also more senior, positions in the 
colonial administration which provided enough money 
to partake in the benefits of Western technology. 
Education became so popular that missionary societies 
could use the provision of education as the main 
carrot for spreading the gospel. 
The rapid spread of, sometimes advanced, • 
education and the concomitant rise in understanding 
and self-confidence, soon combined with the equalising 
forces generated by the enclaves of colonial wealth 
to erode colonial supremacy. This erosion was only 
aided by the fact that the colonial power usually felt 
conscience-bound to provide health services•(though 
not an equitable opportunity structure) which led to 
an unprecedented population explosion which put further 
pressure on the enclaves of wealth. A case in point 
is the Mau Mau uprising against the Kenya settlers 
largely for the sake of land which often had not been 
part of the original Kikuyu settled area. 
It is such forces which eventually led to 
Independence in the decade between 1955 and 1965. 
1j4. After Independence. 
As we observed, the new poverty not only 
motivated a search for methods to increase the cake 
through innovation and education but also released 
pressures for redistribution of the cake, especially 
where the accumulation of wealth in the colonial 
enclaves was concerned. 
Immediately after Independence, the first 
order of business was redistribution, not so much from 
rich to.poor, as well as from non-African to African. 
In fact, the period was characterised more by a game of 
ethnic musical chairs than by structural change. 
Africans simply filled the positions vacated by the 
Colonialists. They took over their houses, leave 
benefits, salaries, etc and adopted their upper-class 
lifestyles with a vengeance, often stopping at little 
in their pursuit of wealth —no longer ceiling-', bound.' 
For the people it was Immensely gratifying -and 
hope-raising- to see brother Africans take over the 
colonial enclave. In fact, it seemed for a while that 
the equalising forces and the high hopes raised in the 
political campaigns leading to Independence could be 
satisfied by the game of ethnic musical chairs. No 
matter how much Africans accumulated, as long as it 
was Africans doing so, the masses seemed satisfied with 
such fruits of Independence. And, as long as colour-
based differences in wealth persisted, the efforts to 
redistribute wealth from Europeans and Asians to Africans 
could continue to occupy the headlines. 
But there is little to distribute and the basic 
structure has not changed very much. There is still an 
upper-class enclave, supported by creaming off cash 
crop production. There is still a supportive cadre of 
junior staff, shopkeepers, organized laborers, small 
traders and such. And there is still the tribal peasant 
society, with its new desires but basically unchanged 
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outcomes, which, normally makes up around 90% of the 
population. Within this "basic hierarchy, a fourth 
category continues to emerge; Those who no longer find 
a future in farming uue to the growing scarcity of 
land, the decreased viability of the rural area, or the 
expectations raised by having acquired some formal, though 
often irrelevant, education. These people thus seek to 
escape from peasant life by finding.paid employment as 
beer/changaa brewers, petty traders, shoe shine boys, 
hawkers of lottery tickets, maize roasters, prostitutes, 
artisans and other jobs in what is usually called the 
"informal sector". It is to this category that the call 
of "back to the land" is frequently directed.. 
-Admittedly, some African Governments have gone 
far in their efforts to create an equitable opportunity 
structure.- Admittedly, also',' the new African Governments 
have done much to stimulate the adoption of income-, and 
welfare-generating innovations among the rural tribal 
masses. Admittedly, finally, there is a,softening of 
income differentials by the adherence of the first-
generation elites to the traditional system of mutual 
obligation and aid. 
But the new poverty is spreading fast and the 
population continues to grow extremely rapidly (3.3$ 
in Kenya). Thus the equalising forces are still at 
work. And the day when the last Asian or European 
has been expropriated and the last acre of unused land 
has been allotted is drawing near -and with it the day 
when the equalising forces will be at. work among 
Africans themselves. The signs are already beginning 
to emerge. Not only in the disgruntled rumblings of 
those "misguided payukaring individuals who critise 
the achievements after Independence", but also in the 
villages where some have refused to build,self-help 
roads which "will only bring us the dust of the Mercedes's 
of the big shots". 
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We are here not predicting the revolution. 
We don't "believe in it as a Panacea for problems. Also, 
distribution of available wealth is only one road to 
satisfying popular desires, the other being the growth 
of the available cake. Finally, all evidence suggests 
that the tribal, peasant is unlikely to rise up. If any 
group does, its is more likely to be one which has 
progressed rapidly but then experienced a set-back 
(Davies, 1962). 
What we are trying to show is that the new 
poverty continues to provide an undiminished motivation. 
That, therefore, the same forces which helped destroy 
the colonial system are still at work; that they cannot 
be kept at bay for long by the game of ethnic musical 
chairs; and that they cannot be negated or suppressed, 
except perhaps in rigid and oppressive class structures 
which mitigate against the heritage of African socialism. 
Such then is the, perhaps familiar, problem 
facing African Governments: to chart a strategy for 
development which, on the one hand, utilises the 
motivating forces generated by the new poverty, but on 
the other, avoids being destroyed by them. Such a 
strategy must, for reasons implicit in the above historical 
sketch, consist of a careful mix of growth and equitable 
distribution. African Governments are indeed faced with 
a very difficult problem, for the solution of which a 
blueprint does not, as yet, exist. 
This book is concerned with that problem and 
seeks to contribute to its solution, for as far as 
policies for the development of the peasant sector are 
concerned. 
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1t 2 • THE PROBLEM FOR ENQUI.' T 
1j2,1, Equity and Gr;o wth. 
To satisfy the single-minded popular interest 
in money and improvement of the quality of life, all 
African Governments have embraced development as the 
one over-riding goal of national endeavour, Their 
strategies for development differ, however, especially 
with respect, to the emphasis placed on either growth 
or distribution0 Since there is no prescription for 
their long-run optimal mix, the choice of emphasis is 
more a matter of faith than empirical know-how. 
Of course, growth and :distribution-, are not 
independent* If one emphasises distribution, one must 
still grow to ha.ve something to distribute, a truth 
often neglected* If one empha fses growth, one must 
still distribute to stimulate purchasing power and to 
alleviate the pressures which led to the embrace of 
development policies in the first place„ 
Yet, there are reasons why over-emphasis on 
distribution may harm growth and vice versa. Often, 
for instance, growth can only be bought at the expense 
of accumulation "by few, not only when it comes to 
satisfying the condition:.* under which foreign capital 
is usually provided, but also in case of agricultural 
production which often grows fastest when credit services 
and extension are concentrated on large, educated and 
progressive farmers. Thus socio-political goals 
may conflict with production targets and policies geared 
towards growth may be incompatible with equitable 
development. 
What's more, policy makers of every shade1 of 
concern with equity all face an ongoing process which 
can best be described by the age-old generalisations 
"To him who has shall be given"; or the newer generalisations 
"The rich get richer and the poor get children". Yes, 
our society seems characterised by the fact that desires, 
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not subject to scarcity, spread rapidly and equitably, 
leading to the equalising forces described before, while 
the means to satisfy those desires, very much subject 
to the laws of scarcity, tend to accumulate in the 
hands of few, leading to differentiatione Of course, 
it is the policy maker's option to affect the outcome 
of these conflicting tendencies. The challenge is, then, 
to choose a pragmatic policy which avoids equitable 
distribution of hunger as well as the creation of enclaves 
of wealth which only evoke injustice and poverty. 
General models have, in the past, been developed 
to guide such policies or to rationalise them after 
the fact. One Western theory, for instance, led to the 
belief that the negative effects of rapid growth on 
the equit^ r of development would only be of short 
duration. Those who lagged behind would, one day, 
eventually close the gap and catch up. This older 
model thus compared development to a track event. 
Some, such as Kipchoge Keino, run faster than others, 
but all eventually reach the finish (Gaastra van Loon, 1972). 
The older model was inspired by the histories 
of Europe and the United States, where strong labour 
unions could at least ensure a proportional share in 
the increment of the national cake. In this situation, 
the strong popular desires for a better life are 
satisfied by the fact that everyone benefits from the 
rapid growth and thus experiences some improvement, even 
when wealth remains inequitably distributed. 
As soon as such economies stop growing, however, 
pressures towards greater equity can, of course, be 
expected. Necessary conditions for the long-run 
validity of the older model are thus continuous growth 
and an unlimited supply of resources to support it. And 
its these conditions which seem increasingly untenable. 
In fact, one can speak of the emergence of•• a new "image 
pf the limited good". 
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This phrase was originally coined by Foster 
(1965) to describe the worldview of traditional peoples 
faced with limited opportunities. Such people believe 
that, since all good things are limited, the acquisition 
by one man of a larger share of the cake automatically 
led to a smaller share for other. The image is 
illustrated by some Nigerian villagers, with whom one 
of the authors was acquainted, who begged the extension 
worker to stop introducing fertiliser because it allegedly 
pulled fertility (a limited good) from neighbouring 
fields to the one on which it was applied and hence 
caused great discord among the villagers. 
The new image of the limited good seems to 
emerge as the typical product of a period in which the 
rich countries are reaching their limit of useful growth 
and become aware of the easily exhaustible and pollutable 
environment on "spaceship earth". 
A typical protagonist of the new awareness is 
the Club of Rome Report (1972) on "Limits to Growth" 
which drew attention to the fact that the world's 
reserves of coal, iron, copper, etc., all prerequisites 
to growth, would, even under the most favourable assumpt-
ions, not last beyond the year 2100„ Such studies also 
pointed out that the reserves of minerals are not 
sufficient to allow every one of the world's citizens 
the same level of wealth as presently enjoyed by the 
average US citizen. 
These studies thus not only revived the image 
of the limited, good, but also put in sharp focus its 
corrolary: the acquisition of a large share of th'e 
limited good implies that proportionately less is available 
to others. the international level, for instance:-,, 
the control of accfess to natural resources by developed 
countries can, in this light, be taken to imply the 
permanence of poverty of presently developing countries. 
That is, accumulation of the limited good by some preempts 
the opportunity for others, 
For these reasons, a newer model of development 
(Gaastra Van Loon, 1972) speaks of two football teams, one 
of which, wins some games, becomes popular, commands high 
box-office receipts, buys the best players and coaches, 
acquires TV contracts, etc., and thereby preempts the 
chances of the other team to ever get off the ground. In 
other words the development process has many of the 
features of the small ban! of Marabu storks outside the 
Public Service Club in Nairobi. The biggest stork 
commands the choice territory immediately outside the 
windows.and therefore gets all the bones thrown out by the 
patrons, fiercely attacking other birds who come too 
near. 
It is such rules of the game which, if unchecked, 
seem to govern the.relations between rich and poor, be they 
developing nations, urban versus rural sectors, rapidly 
innovating versus stagnating tribal regions, or rich versus 
poor farmers within the tribal region itself. We mention-', 
these other inequities because an image of the limited 
good seems to be valid also at the national level. Land, 
the scarce positions in the best educational institutions, 
the revenues from cashcrops, the working time of the extension 
worker in the sublocation, the funds available for 
agricultural credit, yes e.ven the demand for agricultural 
products, are all examples of limited goods. Their 
control by few, and the implicit preemption of opportunity 
for others, in the early stages of development, even if 
it has spin-off effects in terms of creating employment 
and demand, may lay the foundations of a society in 
which inequity is a permanent feature. In such a society, 
class structures and other oppressive mechanismsmust be 
developed to contain the equalising forces which originate 
in the "Revolution of Rising Expectations" (Lerner, 1963), 
especially-when rapid growth is not forthcoming, and 
when organised labour is part of the elite, while the- ; 
peasant mass is not organised and has no bargaining power 
whatsoever. 
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The above raises some implications for the 
blueprint for development. Should African Governments 
accept a future in which inequity is a permanent feature? 
Should theyj at the international level, aim at maintaining 
the status of a poor country among the world's nations? 
And should they, at the national level, aim at a society 
which has, as its permanent feature, a mass of semi-
subsistence peasants and a well-protected enclave of 
wealth? Should the Masai, for instance, be incorporated 
as part and parcel of the ecology of National Parks, as 
some East African experiments would suggest? 
We don't believe that such a course should be 
followed, although it is feasible, as the history of 
some Latin American countries indicates. We reject the 
option, however, not because our conscience, dictated 
by prevailing and mod norms, makes us feel we ought to "• 
reject it, but because we. know that permanent inequity 
is not compatible with the equalising forces generated 
by the awareness of the good life possible. Permanent 
inequity, therefore, cannot lead to a stable society in 
which dignity and well-being are undenied, and in which 
human endeavours, other than the pursuit of money to 
catch up with the well-to-do, are made possible. 
To now briefly conclude; we have observed a great 
gap between the well-being known to be possible and the 
one actually experienced. We also observed that a policy 
choice can be made between (l) allowing some to go all 
the waylto 'fill the gap and pulling up the others later; 
and (2) allowing all small increments of improvement 
at a time, which means that initially only few will enjoy 
the level of well-being known to be possible. We then 
argued for an emphasis on the latter approach because 
allowing those who can to go all the way implies that 
they will preempt the opportunity for others which makes 
it impossible to pull up those others later. 
- 15 
Throughout this book we shall thus assume the 
need to search for pragmatic policies which ensure equity 
while optimising growth, and reject policies which 
either maximise growth at the cost of equity or maximize 
equity at the cost of growth. In our search we shall 
limit ourselves to equitable development within a given 
peasant society, leaving aside inequities between nations, 
between cities and their rural hinterland, and between 
different tribal societies, not because such other 
concerns are irrelevant or even independent of our concern, 
but because we do not have the expertise to deal with 
them. 
1,2,2. The Causes of Inequity in the Peasant Community,, 
In an earlier section of this chapter, we had 
occasion to. observe that the pre-colonial tribal, and 
rural, society was egalitarian to the extent that states-
men can evoke African Socialism as a blueprint for a 
future which is firmly rooted in the past. We are now 
no more than 70 years from those tribal beginnings, Yet, 
if one now travels through the former tribal "reserves", 
especially the more advanced ones, one observes a great 
deal of differentiation. 
Some farmers have stone or wooden houses with 
iron sheeted roofs. Others still live in round ..huts 
which, to the unwary observer, seem on fire when the 
smoke of cooking oozes through the thatch. Some women 
haul heavy drums with water up the ridge. Others apparently 
do not have to do so, witness the galvanised tanks for 
collecting and storing rain water in their farm'ys^ds. 
Parts of the road lead one past well-fenced paddocks 
with Priesian cows, but further on one sees an old man 
in a World War II trench coat herding a small band of 
sickly looking native cows. And so on and so forth. 
What, then, has happened to the formerly so 
egalitarian tribal society? What will happen to it in 
future if present trends continue? And what can be done 
to ensure its more equitable development? These are the 
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questions which, will occupy us throughout this "book, 
the research problem of our focus. 
In trying to account for what has happened to 
the tribal society, we shall concentrate on the consequences 
of innovation, and especially the introduction of cash-
crops, since neither the Colonial nor the African Govern-
ment have done much to develop and diffuse innovations 
which could improve subsistence. We shall focus on 
innovation because it, and the services such as extension, 
credit and marketing, which seek to promote it, have 
so far been the source of rural wealth and must, therefore, 
contain the seeds of. the present disparities.. Several 
reasons can, in fact, be given why innovation could cause 
inequity. 
Important is that innovations are never adopted 
by all at the same time. Instead, their diffusion 
pattern usually follows a growth curve (Rogers and Shoe-
maker, 1971) which implies that the earlier adopters 
benefit longer from the innovation. This may be an 
advantage, for instance, when money is at their disposal 
before land prices have gone up. Also, the early 
adopters'come in the market at a time when prices for 
the product concerned are still high and thus reap a 
pioneer profit, while later adopters just glut the 
marketa Those who have not adopted at all may even find 
themselves barred from adopting because quotas have 
been established to maintain the price, as is the case 
with coffee in Kenya, or their income may actually 
decrease when the innovation leads to over-production 
-and price decline- of a substitute for a traditional 
crop, .such as hybrid maize. 
Initially small differences between neighbours 
based on differences in adoption behavior, may thus 
have grave consequences for the income differential 
between them later. The one who adopted coffee ten 
years ago '..acquired the money to buy a grade cow and 
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an extra plot of land. A loan from his coffee 
society allowed him to put up a fence to protect his 
cattle from rampant diseases. Meanwhile, he sent his 
son to school when the going was still good and gained 
a foothold for his family in the urban society. In 
fact the income of the son now helps pay the schoolfees 
of other children. Yes, by the time the other farmer 
wakes up, it may be too late for him ever to catch up 
with his neighbour, even though, ten years ago, one 
would not have noticed any difference between them. 
It is understandable that literally hundreds of 
reasearches have sought to answer the questions "Why 
the difference?" Let us look at some of their answers 
to determine whether past stupidity, laziness or other 
faults justify the present poverty of the late or non-
adopters . 
One would expect the early adopters to be the 
ones who came into contact with Western,lifestyles 
earlier and therefore experienced relative poverty which 
motivated them to change when others were still content 
with tribal life. One Yoruba elder, for instance, told 
one of the authors, when asked why he had introduced 
cocoa into his village, that he had seen cotton dresses 
and galvanised iron roofs when working on the raildroad 
in Lagos and had wished to acquire them. Research bears 
out that the early adopters usually have more contact 
with the world outside their village through travel, 
education, and exposure to mass and other media than 
later adopters (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971). 
Of course, the question remains why the Yoruba 
elder went to Lagos in the first place and why earlier 
adopters in general have greater external contact. 
Empirical research has only come up with few differences 
between early and late adopters which can be thought 
to have existed before contact with the West. One is 
that early adopters usually have larger farms than late 
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adopters and another that early adopters hold more 
traditional leadership positions which may have allowed 
them greater access to labour, the scarce resource in 
the early days. Yet another, and related, reason for 
earliness may he the phase of one's lifecycle during 
@ 
which one was hit by the initial wave of change. If 
one was a venturesome young man, just barred from 
showing one's prowess as a warrior by the 
Pax Brittanica, as was the case after the Yoruba wars 
(Toxopeus, 1970), one might have been more ready to 
adopt than an old man who prepared himself for a dignified 
end. Alternatively, a man with a large number of young 
children, and hence a large labour force, may have faced 
less risk in experimenting with an innovation than an 
older, feeble, man whose children had all married. 
Apart from such mundane reasons for the difference 
between "progressive" farmers and late adopters, researchers 
have also sought for psychological mechanisms which 
might explain them. A great variety of these have been 
proposed, such as the difference in culture pattern 
(Hofstee, 1964), need for achievement (McClellandt .19'6l), 
efficacy (Inkeles, 1966) or the expectancy of internal 
control (Rotter, 1966; Roling, 1970). The problem with 
most of these concepts is, however, that they describe 
the result of success -and hence.predict further success-
rather than explain why success, be it in controlling 
the environment or in excelling over others, was experienced 
in the first place. 
The work of Carolyn Barnes, quoted in this book, 
tries to throw some light on the latter question. However, 
even her work does not seem to provide reasons which 
justify punishing present late adopters with poverty 
or banishing their children, or even grand-children, 
to a life without outlook. 
One essential difference between progressive and 
non-progressive farmers, observed all over the world, 
is the greater use by the former of Government services, 
@ 
Personal communication, 'Wicky Meynen. 
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"be it extension, credit or marketing. Not only do the, 
progressive farmers, having experienced their benefits, 
actively seek those services, those offering the services 
also concentrate on the larger, more innovative farmers, 
a practice usually referred to as the"Progressive Parmer 
Strategy". There are several reasons why this practice 
is followed. 
At the policy making level, it seems wise to 
concentrate scarce resources available for planned change 
on large farmers who are ready to change and can plant 
large acreages, allowing production targets to be reached 
quickly. The field worker has similar considerations; 
concentration on progressive farmers brings quick rewards, 
and leads to dramatic monthly reports. Other factors may, 
however, also operate at the field level. Progressive 
farmers actually demand services and complain when they 
rre not forthcoming. Also, there is less social distance 
between them and the field worker than is the case with 
less progressive farmers. Meanwhile, the larger farmers 
are often influential enough to actually affect the 
career of the field worker, through politicians and 
senior officers, or rich enough to regularly reward the 
field worker. There must, for instance, be a reason 
why some field workers are willing to vouch that a farmer 
has the 15 acres of maize required for a GMR loan while 
he has only four. 
Such processes explain why, as the rural area 
advances, field workers spend more and more time on 
helping to maintain the enterprises of progressive farmers 
and less and less time on. promoting innovation among 
other farmers. Of course, these observations largely 
refer, to extension, but credit services also benefit the 
large, progressive farmers most, if alone because of 
eligibility requirements, such as the 15 acres in case 
of GMR loans, or the need to provide surety in case of other 
1 oahs. _ 
A special seasonal crop.; loan called Guaranteed 
Minimum Return. 
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Thus Government services usually help those 
who need least help (van den Ban9 1963)? that is, 
those who are already on the road to accumulation and 
could probably have helped themselves. In other words, 
government services usually only strengthen the 
inequities which originate in the diffusion process 
itself. They help innovative farmers maintain their 
lead and rapidly expand once they have taken the first 
steps on the road to "progress",, 
1,2,3. The Consequences of Inequity For the Peasant Community 
What, then, are the consequences of these" 
processes for the peasant society? In the first place, 
the relative prosperity of some implies the relative 
poverty of the rest. That is, the better outcomes of 
the progressive set the norm for the good life seen as 
within reach for everybody. Of course, the colonial 
enclaves had already created desires, but ?/hen one's 
neighbour is able to satisfy some of them, the latent 
desire changes to virulent expectations. 
A typical example is a village in Nigeria which 
had produced an internationally famous economist. When 
one of the authors asked farmers what they wanted their 
sons to become, many of them replied: "professor, 
like Dr X", Thus the comparability or empathy within 
reference groups, which originate in.the egalitarian 
tribal past, continue to operate even when differentiating 
processes have seriously undermined their validity. No one 
yet says: "His outcome is not for me because I am different" 
as happens in a class society* 
Thus the outcomes of the progressives set the 
norm for the good life and increase the level of well-being 
at which the rural community is subjectively experienced 
as viable. .This means that those, who have not progressed, 
experience a decrease in the subjective viability of their 
rural life (Constandse, 1962)„ Sometimes, viability also 
decreases in absolute terms ?/hen prices decline as a result 
of over-production, as can be expected soon in case 
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of hybrid maize in Kenya. Farmers who still grow 
their acre of local maize will get less for whatever 
surplus they usually sell than they did before. 
Unless the less progressive farmers escape the 
decrease.in viability by boozing or other unrealistic 
behavior, they will be motivated to try and improve their 
situation. What options do they have to do so? 
In the first place they can try to escape the 
constraints facing them in the rural.area by seeking 
wage employment in the.towns. The problem is that the 
less-progressive farmers are probably least qualified 
and thus have a disadvantage in the struggle for scarce 
jobs. 
In the second place, they can try to improve 
their farms by adopting innovations. The problem is 
that Government services promoting innovations bypass 
them, as we saw earlier. If they adopt, they are still 
faced with low prices or even quota regulations barring 
them, from adoption. What's more, innovations most 
suited for small scale enterprises have hardly been 
developed, while suitable candidates which helped small 
farmers in developed countries, such as broiler production 
and horticulture, are often pre-empted by big companies 
such as the BAT or Delmonte in Kenya. 
Thus the third, and most realistic, .prospect 
for less progressive farmers is for them to accept their 
different status, resign to the fact that they will be 
poor compared to the progressive farmers and become 
casual laborers on the latter' farms to obtain some cash 
to support their small subsistence enterprises. This, 
of course, is the blueprint for the peasant areas 
developed by the Colonial Regime. Thus the Swynnerton 
Plan (1954) states; "In future....former Government 
policy will have to be reversed and able, energetic or 
rich Africans will be able to acquire more la.nd, and 
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and bad and poor farmers less, creating a landed and 
landless class.... This is a normal stage in the 
evolution of a country". 
The predicament of choice for non-progressive 
farmers, described above, must be seen in the light of 
a future characterised by two processes which make the 
situation more desparate. 
In the first place, the population explosion 
continues to increase the pressure on the resources of 
the peasant community. Should fathers subdivide their 
land for their sons, banishing them to greater poverty 
than they experienced theselves? Or should they continue 
to sacrifice their well-being to pay for education which 
usually does not lead anywhere? Or what? 
In the second place, as the peasant sector becomes 
more modernised, not only in Kenya, but also in other 
countries with similar climatic conditions, the production 
of such cash crops as coffee, tea, and sugar will increase, 
leading to glutted markets because the demand for 
agricultural products is notoriously inelastic. Nobody 
eats twice as much when the price of food is cut by 
half. Meanwhile the local market for agricultural 
products is very small because 90$ of the population 
lives by subsistence and/or has little purchasing power. 
In Kenya, the local market is further reduced by the 
fact.that members of the elite usually own a piece of 
land, from which they obtain whatever they need, if they 
don't actually compete with peasants by producing cash 
crops. Thus the terms of trade will become increasingly 
unfavourable for the peasant society as a whole. This 
means that only large and efficient farmers can persist, 
and small inefficient farmers are driven out, as happened 
in Europe (where farmers now make up as little as 5 o f 
the working population) and may happen here soon because 
of the "quantum leaps" of agricultural productivity in 
developing countries. 
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Are the processes described, above a "normal 
stage in the evolution of a country" as Swynnerton wanted 
us to believe? It cannot be denied that they character-
ised a historical phase in Europe. But then that same 
phase was also characterised by an industrial revolution 
demanding so much labour that Britain had to enact 
enclosure laws to force people off the land. Meanwhile 
there was no competition from a highly efficient industry 
in developing countries, no concern for misery,, no 
minimum wages, no population explosion and even then 
an escape to America, Australia or the colonies. 
No, the history of the UK does not seem replicable 
in East Africa and can, therefore, not be a guide for 
policy. In fact, Swynnerton's blueprint might well 
pave the way to a permanently polarised rural society, 
which contains the seeds for future misery and unrest, 
as is the case in Latin America. 
1,2,4. The Options for Policy-
Indeed, it seems easy to extrapolate a bleak 
future from the trends presently at work in peasant 
society. :Some observers have, therefore, become very 
pessimistic. They have lost all hope that the peasant 
society can make it in the present set-up and see, as 
the only solution, the imposition of a system which does 
not allow private enterprise and thus removes the 
usurperers and accumulators from the scene. 
Such views assume that, in a private enterprise 
system, the poor will not be given an opportunity to 
improve their situation, that they will therefore become 
poor and poorer, to eventually reach a point where they 
lose all hope and only find recourse in fatalism, apathy, 
and the egoistic struggle to stay alive. Since they 
have nothing to lose, such people will be susceptible 
to ideas which promise the imposition of a more equitable 
system by force. 
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Of course, such, situations do exist. Several 
countries in Latin America, for instance, seem characterised 
by a fatalistic peasant mass which has nothing to lose 
and, therefore, does explode in frustration, as during 
the "Violencia" in Colombia. The only way in which the 
equalising forces can restore a natural balance in such 
a situation is probably indeed a revolution. 
The African peasant society is, however, still 
far from that point. In fact, the African peasant seems 
an activist who struggles on because, so far, his 
conditions has steadily improved. One of the authors 
remembers how he, after having learnt- about "traditionalism" 
in his student days, went to Southern Italy where he 
recognised many of the traditionalistic traits, such as 
distrust, fatalism, lack of innovativeness and resistance 
to change. His next assignment was in Nigeria, where 
he expected to find even worse "traditionalism" because 
that country seemed so much closer to a traditional past 
than Southern Italy. He was very surprised indeed to 
find a trusting and open society of which the members" 
were actively engaged in the pursuit of "progress" and 
constantly pressed their Government for assistance in 
development activities which they usually initiated 
themselves. Thus it became clear that "traditionalism" 
is more a product of misery and oppression than of 
tradition. And also that the African.peasant, though 
close to a "traditional" past, is an activist because 
he has not yet been oppressed. 
In Kenya, activism also characterises the majority 
of the peasants. Foreign observers at Farmers' Training 
courses in Kenya are, for instance, surprised at the 
proud, if not tough and no-nonsense attitude with which 
small-holder course participants, including women, approach 
teachers and senior officials addressing them. Similarly, 
one finds peasants who refuse to pay school fees for 
the days on which their children have to line up along 
the road to wave to high officials. Womens' groups, 
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"based on indigenous initiative, are responsible for 
the very rapid replacement or thatch by corrugated iron 
roof s in Central Province. And so on. 
What emerges is the possibility of a policy 
which keeps alive and stimulates such peasant activism 
and thus allows the equalising forces to operate continually 
and gradually towards maintaining a humane and balanced 
state, instead of hemming them in by oppressive measures 
"until they explode. 
A necessary condition for such a policy to be 
effective is not the abolishment of private enterprise, 
but the stringent control of its tendency towards 
disparity and the avoidance of processes by which the 
equalising forces are hemmed in. 
And it is this necessary condition which often 
'does not seem to be fulfilled in present-day Africa. 
Instead, leaders and elites take advantage of every 
chance to enrich themselves in an incredibly short-
sighted opportunism. What's worse, they clamp down on 
budding expressions of the equalising forces and weaken 
the.mechanisms for their gradual and continuous operation. 
Yes, even those who publicly pay lipservice to equitable 
development, all too often turn out to be hyenas in disguise. 
It is such conditons which eventually lead to 
the impoverishment and desparation of the peasant mass. 
And it is such conditions which tempt people to embrace 
more radical policies, which, in turn, elicit greater 
oppression, etc. Thus, it is the gluttony of leaders 
and elites which threatens the future of African society, 
rather than private enterprise. Of course, there are 
those who claim that one cannot control the former 
without destroying the latter. We, however, see the 
two as potentially independent of each other. 
That means that we believe that a stable future 
for a country like Kenya, which is based on private 
enterprise and has achieved so much through that system, 
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can only be safeguarded if its leaders and elites 
accept self-imposed limitations to accumulation and allow 
the operation of equalising forces - even when it hurts 
a little. 
We have, perhaps naievely, assumed that such 
self-contr'0'1' is possible', "feasible and probable and based 
our work on "that as'sumption. That is, the utility of 
our work'depends on the existence'of'a sincere intent 
- to vigourously promote equitable development. We 
thereby admittedly take the risk that our work remains -
irrelevant. 
But the risk is a calculated one. We have 
encountered many policy makers who do have the sincere 
intent. We have seen the 1972 Kenya Budget which slaps 
heavy taxes on urban luxury goods. And "how many other 
states have the honesty and the nerve to commission 
inquiries, similar to the one ILO carried out in Kenya, 
into the' shadier and more disturbing aspects of their 
own national life" (Hughes, 1973). 
But the risk we take is a calculated one most 
Of all because equitable development is increasingly 
becoming a matter of rational choice, rather than a 
matter of conscience, sincerely and human compassion. 
And this not only because of the threat to instability. 
The newest evidence suggests that a country such as 
Kenya which allows "its now beginning stratification 
.by incomes and education to continue until it becomes 
a rigid and institutionalised barrier in the next generation", 
(ILO, 1972,p...) will actually lose in terms of develop-
ment and growth 
In a recent article, James Grant (1973) shows 
that rapid growth, the goal of the first development 
decade, was successfully achieved in many countries. In 
Kenya, "the economy has even grown much faster than in. 
most developing countries in Africa or elsewhere" (ILO, 
1972, p ). But says Grant, "the trickle-down theory 
of development - whereby the poor supposedly benefit 
from overall economic growth or policies benefitting 
the rich - is proving utterly inadequate to the needs 
of the poorer halves of the population in developing 
countries.... Country after country reveals the same 
pattern of relatively high growth rates, combined both 
with a failure to meet other major needs and with dramatic 
inequities in the distribution of economic and social 
benefits". 
As a result, Grant says, many people turn to 
China for a solution because it "appears to have found 
a pattern that combines increasing national output 
with full employment, falling birthrates and comprehensive, 
low cost, social services". But other, non—communist, 
countries.have found such a pattern as well. "South Korea, 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan had much higher rates 
of increase in their work forces during the sixtees than 
did China, yet they achieved rapid growth and drastically 
reduced unemployment, while improving income distribution 
and dramatically reducing birth rates". In fact, The 
East Asian experience shows that "the right kinds of 
social justice policies" (such as the ones proposed for 
Kenya by ILO) "can increase production rather than cause 
its stagnation". The GDP of Taiwan and Korea actually 
grew at 9.9 and 9.2% respectively during the sixtees. 
The East Asian experience also shows that "it 
may now be possible to attack several problems simuianeously. 
Por example, a comprehensive land reform programme, backed 
up by an effective credit system, simultaneously increases 
savings, output, farm employment and demand for labour 
intensive products, while improving income distribution 
and attitudes towards family planning." 
William Rich (1973) goes deeper into the relation-
ship between the equity of the distribution of income 
and social services on the one hand and the reduction of 
birth rates on the other. Not only seem "family planning 
programmes to be much more successful in those developing 
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countries which have assigned high priority in their 
development programmes to a more equitable distribution 
of incomes and social services", but "the very strategies 
which cause the greatest improvement in the welfare of 
the entire population also have the greatest.effect on 
reducing population growth", "despite low per capita 
incomes and despite absence or newness of. family 
planning programmes". In other, words, Governments which 
buy equitable development policies get reduced birthrates 
thrown into the bargain. Table 1, 1 illustrates the 
point. 
Table 1, 1. Selective Indicators of Conditions 
1 
in South j 
Korea and Brazil i 
; j 1 
i SOUTH KOREA { BRAZIL 
\ f 
Population growth rates 1958-• 
-
3.Of* 3.0% 
1964 2.7% 2.9% 
i 1971 2.0% 2.8% 
Income per capita (1971) ft. 280 ^ 395 
GNP growth rates in the 1960s 9.0% 6.0 % 
Ratio of income richest 20% to V 
poorest 20% (1970) 5. to 1 25 ..to 1 
Literacy (1970) 71.0% 61.0% 
Infant deaths per 1000 births 7 
(1970) 41 94 
} Joblessness negligible • serious 
Effective land reform Yes ... - No 
Family Planning Programme 
- ' ' ' ' ! 
Yes(by 196^ 
: 
No 
Sources William R'ich, "Smaller Families through Jobs j ii ] ... and Justice, , International Development Review, Vol 14, ! 
number 3, 1972/73, PP 10 -15. 
i 
1 ! 
i 
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Thus we assume a sincere intent to embrace policies 
promoting equitable development because such policies 
seem best to serve the interests of the nation. "We 
know,, in effect, that there is no rational alternative 
to moving towards policies of greater social equity" 
(Robert Ma". Namara, 1972). Given such policies, we 
must now ask what options are available in the conditions 
presently prevailing in peasant society? 
We begin.with that old war horse, the "back to 
the land" policy, which is aimed at those who have left 
the rural areas because they saw no future in them. Such 
a policy would therefore only work if the viability of 
the rural area could be greatly improved, not only by 
providing, amenities, but also by providing individuals 
with land?capital and knowledge to enable them to earn 
a living. Even then, the limited land and the fast growing 
population would allow provision for only few not now 
living in the rural areas. For the rest, including those 
who leave the rural area because they are members of 
large families reared on small farms, urban or rural 
non-farm employment will have to be created. 
A country like Kenya is, of course, very much 
aware of this exigency. Long term plans for urban 
development have been made which take into account 
phenomenal growth of present and even planned urban 
centers. For instance, during the present plan period, 
with its heavy emphasis on rural development, only 12$ 
of the average annual budget was spent on rural development 
( ). This seems pragmatic policy. 
Couldn't large scale settlement on virgin or 
ex—settler's land remove the. limiting factor to the 
"back to the land" policy? Admittedly, around .000 
poor or landless peasants have been settled up to 1972 
( ).'What's more, peasants themselves have swarmed 
like bees to virgin territory. Areas such as Mau Warok, 
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which, are still shown as a forest on the map, are now 
densely settled small-holder areas, Kenyan farmers 
can apparently even "be found in Southern Tanzania near 
the Zambian border«, Such settlement has thus provided 
many who had no future in the "reserves" with an 
opportunity. But the land remains a limited good and 
settlement policies can thus only buy time, a safety 
valve with limited capacity. 
Of course, an Israeli driving through East 
Africa might well exclaim at the vast expanses of high-
potential semi-desert still available, a call quickly 
picked up by those who resist family planning. But 
irrigation requires a great deal of capital which thus 
presumes cash crop production and,.therefore, large 
markets. The irrigation schemes now on the drawing 
boards will probably satisfy existing demand for the 
time to come, as the Mwea and Kano Schemes do for Rice. 
And they can only absorb few of those seeking a livelihood. 
No, wherever one turns, the problems of peasant 
society can not, ultimately, be solved by.settlement, 
be it on ex-settler®s farms, virgin lands, or irrigation 
schemes. Still, settlement performs a useful function 
by buying time. 
More time can be bought, of course -and much 
bitterness avoided- if people with good incomes and 
pension schemes were forbidden to own land, except for 
a small plot to build a country home. Indeed, some 
peasants fail to see the difference between the former 
white settlers and the African elites who- own large tracts 
of land- and more will do so as differences in nationality 
and ethnicity are forgotten • 
and. differences in wealth and opportunity become 
paramount. Yes, redistribution.of African owned estates 
will be the next source of land, unless' the, leaders take 
recourse to oppressive measures, mute the Parliament, 
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and thereby destroy the chances for the gradual 
operation of the equalising forces towards a just 
society. 
But resettlement can not ensure the equitable 
development of rural areas in.the long run. What 
policies can those with a sincere intent embrace, given 
a peasant area settled to capacity? After all, that 
is the narrower focus of this book. 
One's first thoughts go out to Tanzania's 
daring and sympathetic Ujamaa experiment., which is so 
often criticised without being given time to prove itself. 
Its two years of operation have demonstrated that 
peasants in very poor subsistence areas are very willing 
to collectivize, especially when it becomes clear to 
them that Government services such as water, and credit 
will only be available to those who live in Ujamaa 
villages. In the more advanced cash crop areas, however, 
where progress has been rapid -and where most differenti-
ation has thus occurred- many farmers, especially the 
relatively prosperous, see collectivisation as a threat 
and resist it. Thus Tanzania's Kilimanjaro/Meru farmers 
seem disinclined to accept Ujamaa. In Kenya, farmers 
in Central Province, Kisii and other relatively advanced 
growth centers would probably not react differently. 
Are such hard-working farmers potentially 
Kulaks, to be sacrificed for dogmatic convictions, as 
they were in Russia? Or is it possible to develop a 
pragmatic and less drastic policy which achieves 
equitable development via alternative routes? It is 
our conviction that such a policy can be developed and 
this book reports on our efforts to demonstrate the 
feasibility of some of its strategy elements. 
Let us briefly list the elements of the policy 
which we deem a feasible alternative route to equitable 
rural development. They are: 
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10 Vigorous continuation of the development 
of welfare services which are available 
to all, such as.roads, water, electricity, 
health services, schools, recreational 
facilities, etc. This implies continued 
support of Haramhee (selfhelp) efforts to 
• develop amenities and services, 
2, Vigorous development of agricultural 
innovation packages specially adapted to 
small farms, combined with strict control 
of preemptive production by big companies 
or large farms-using such innovations. 
3. Rechanneling of extension, credit and 
marketing services to those small-holders 
who lag behind in development so as to 
enable them to adopt the innovations 
packages. The "progressive" farmers will forge 
ahead anyway with less assistance. 
4o Strong emphasis on group extension over 
individual extension methods to increase 
coverage of scarce Government resources 
so as to enable inclusion of small farmers. 
5. Support of the elements listed above by 
(a) imposition of a ceiling to land ownership 
and redistribution of excess land, (b) the 
vigorous promotion of contraceptive methods, 
and (c) the development of rural industries. 
A policy based on these elements could ensure 
the stable, equitable development of peasant areas, while 
maintaining the freedom and the benefits of the free 
enterprise system as a source of rapid growth. The 
authors consider such a policy politically feasible 
in Kenya, because it fits with the basic guidelines laid 
out in Sessional laper No 10 (1955) and what's more, 
beneficial for the efficiency of the allocation of the 
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country's rural resources. It is well known, for 
instance, that Kenyan peasant farms of less than 10 
acres have a higher gross output per acre, a higher 
net profit per acre, a higher percent of land under 
crops and a higher labour use per acre than farms 
with more than 10 acres (ILO, 1972, p. 167). 
A Policy based on the elements outlined above 
has also been strongly recommended by the influential 
report of the ILO Mission to Kenya in 1971. With 
regard to agriculture, the report makes the 
recommendation that "there must be a major shift in 
agricultural policy in favour of the small farmer, 
through a whole range of extension, research, credit,' 
input, pricing and marketing policies, as well as -• 
through land and land-tax policies designed to encourage 
further subdivision of large holdings" (ILO, 1972, p. 
326). Within this broad recommendation, the report 
pleads (p. 153) for (l) more research to develop 
innovations suited to intensive small-holder production, 
(2) a concentration of extension services and credit 
on the forgotten and poor farmers among the small holders 
(here the report actually quotes our experiment in 
Tetu ) and (.3) the "use of group and mass extension 
techniques instead of approaches to the individual 
farmer which has been the main method used in the past". 
In this book, we shall be concerned with 
innovations and especially with their dissemination 
among poor, laggardly farmers through group extension 
methods. We have concentrated especially on the 
latter two policy elements because their implementation 
by a policy maker poses severe practical problems which 
people with our profession could help solve. 
Of course, planned diffusion of innovations 
to poor farmers via group extension methods presupposes 
the existence of suitable innovations. Therefore, we 
The method we used in Tetu has also been enclosed 
by the the Wamalewa Training Review Committee (Kenya 
Govt, 1972, p 39) 
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shall, before coining to the narrower research problem 
of this book, deal briefly with the innovations 
themselves, although we do not have the expertise to 
provide detailed assistance in the issue. 
So far the rural areas in Africa have witnessed 
two agricultural "revolutions". The first was the cash 
crop revolution, which is . losing some of its steam 
because it was based on a few export crops which now 
suffer the consequences o.^eover-pro duct ion. The cash 
crop revolution provided/first source of money income 
for the tribal society, but also laid the founda. tions 
for its present inequities. 
The second revolution has not spread to all 
African countries but has definitely hit Kenya. It 
is the "Green Revolution", the rapid dissemination 
of new high yielding foodgrain varieties. In Kenya, 
the Green Revolution is based on hybrid maize and 1972 
marked the first time in Kenya's history when the 
Minister for Agriculture could confidently predict 
that from now on maize surplusses could normally be 
expected. 
But the Green Revolution is also losing some 
of its steam as the markets for food grains become 
glutted. Besides the Green Revolution further 
consolidated the advantages of those who had benefitted 
from the cashcrop revolution, and left a large 
proportion of the peasants relatively, if not absolutely 
worse off than before. 
One cannot expect to solve the present 
inequities by promoting the innovations of the two 
revolutions among those who have not adopted them yet. 
It will be necessary to do so, but it will be especially 
necessary to develop new innovations suited for small-
holder production. Such money earners for smallholders 
must be developed because the old innovations have lost 
much of their steam and cannot allow the laggards to 
catch up. ' 
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The development and testing of such new innovations 
requires a reorientation of present agricultural research, 
teaching and input industry. So far, research has 
been largely geared to the conditions on large farms. 
Agricultural teaching has produced people who feel that 
large, mechanised enterprises are the only dignified 
form of agriculture, and are little concerned with the 
peasant farm ana its particular problems. Thus one 
finds a DAO in a peasant area who talks of "harrowing" 
when referring to land preparation by hoe. The input 
industry, finally, is only slowly coming around to 
producing small quantity packages which suffice for 
an acre, although labeling and instructions still leave 
much to be desired- The same can be said for the 
input distribution services in rural 
areas, which often require farmers to travel many miles 
on foot to bring inputs to their farms. 
Yes, the task laid out for research, teaching 
and input industry is enormous, if they want to come . 
up with innovation pacakages suitable for small and 
tiny holders and geared towards sophisticated foreign 
markets and/or the local urban population which is 
expected to increase 6 fold by the year 2000 ( )„ 
Some strides have been made but most remains to be done. 
The fruit available in urban markets, except Mombasa, 
is of abominable quality. Methods for improving the 
production of goat meat, mutton and beans are not yet 
available. Chicken and pig production, both very suitable 
for small holder enterprises, remain very risky ventures 
for small farmers and little assistance is provided 
to them. Instead, BAT has .just been given approval 
for a large broiler industry. Small scale grain storage 
facilities, and methods of silage and fodder crop 
production are still hardly available. And so on and 
so forth. 
Activity is urgently required; Research and 
the dissemination of its results taken a long time. 
The Green Revolution bore fruit in Kenya in 1972, but 
the research on which it is based was initiated in 
1955. 
The present lack of innovations adapted to 
the conditions on small scale farms was apparent not 
only in Nigeria where farmers asked; "After cocoa 
what do we do?" but also in Kenya, After long 
discussions with the agricultural staff we finally 
had to settle on hybrid maize as the most suitable 
innovation on which to base our experiments. Apart 
from coffee (which has a quotum), tea and pyrethrum 
(which are limited to certain ecological zones) and 
dairy production, only a handful of innovations was 
available, even in the high potential area in which 
we worked. And none of them cculd be recommended 
by the agricultural staff because they did not provide 
a reasonable margin of profit at reasonable risk 
to the small scale farmer., 
It was only towards the end of our involvement 
in the experiment that an innovation became available 
which seems well .juit^ d to small-holder conditions. 
Developed by Jan Mulder of FAO, it is a method of stall-
feeding dairy cattle on a mixture of Napier grass and 
urea molasses, a by-product of sugar production which 
had, so far, only caused severe pollution in the 
rivers in which it was dumped. The method allows 
increasing the number of cows kept on an acre from 1 
to 2-g- and can double the profit per acre compared with 
conventional methods. A package deal consisting of 
training and a loan for purchasing cows, building the 
feedlot and establishing the Napier grass could greatly 
intensify small-holder farming, although it would have 
to be supported by vigourous advertising and home 
economics extension to increase the consumption of 
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milk and by improvements in its collection, processing 
and distribution facilities. 
Another innovation which is available, but-
cannot be be used because of the monopolistic practices 
of the Maize and Produce Marketing Board, is small 
scale maize storage. The farmer brings his maize to 
the store immediately after harvest. He then gets 
paid the amount which his maize is worth at that time. 
The store keeper sells the maize at the time when the 
price seems highest and the balance is given to the 
farmer, minus storage and handling fees. The store 
can benefit, the small farmer can benefit and the country 
can benefit, given its present storage problems. In 
Indonesia such a storage scheme has been very successful. 
With these examples of what is possible, we 
conclude our appeal for serious efforts to develop and 
proto-type test innovations which can intensify and 
diversify small holder farming, and embark on a more 
detailed discussion of our specific concern with methods 
of rechanneling Government services to those farmers 
who lag behind through group extension methods for 
greater efficiency and effectiveness. But the reader 
must bear in mind that the utility of our work depends 
on the availability of innovations suited to the 
conditions on tiny farms. 
1,2,5. The Specific Research Problem of this Book 
With an economic system which is characterised* 
not by•collectivised agriculture, but by the free 
enterprise of millions of peasants, each having decision 
making power over the small piece of land under his control, 
* personal communication Klaas Kuiper, ABC. 
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the task facing the persuasive capacity of the agencies 
responsible for agricultural development becomes enormous., 
After all? the development of agriculture depends, 
to a large extent, on the adoption of productivity-
increasing innovations by each of the millions' of 
peasants. And adoption only occurs on the basis of 
conviction, itself the product of persuasion, with 
or without intent. That is, thousands of farmers 
must be convinced, instructed and guided to achieve a 
given production target;. 
In Africa, the magnitude of this challenge 
is even more awesome than in developed countries with 
private enterprise agriculture. Roughly 100.000 African 
peasant farms are needed, for instance, to produce as 
much grain as 200 middle size European farms (Collinson, 
1972, p. 66), One of the authors remembers an American 
advisor to the then Eastern Region of Nigeria who claimed 
that he produced as much maize on his farm back home as 
the whole Region did in 1966„ 
But African agencies of rural change not only face 
a greater task than their counterparts in more-developed 
countries, they also have to surmount special problems in 
order to achieve it. 
.' . Whereas developed countries are usually characterised 
by media -saturation in terms of access and exposure to radio, 
newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, films and TV, the African 
peasant is linked with the center with only few or none 
of these media, This means that the African rural change 
agency has to rely on the word-of-mouth communication o 
efforts of thousands of field workers to promote innovation 
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But, whereas the Government field worker in 
the developed country is assisted by a host of commercial 
agents representing seed companies, chemical factories, 
etc, his African counterpart must do most of it alone. 
Even then the latter is often hardly equipped to handle 
his responsibilities. 
The Junior Agricultural Assistant in Kenya, 
for instance, usually has no professional training what-
soever, except for refresher courses of a few weeks duration^ 
It was only in 1971 that Kenya started to give its JAA's 
a 3-months professional training course which was welcomed 
by the lucky ones selected for it with such exclamations 
as "now I can face my farmers" (Rcling, 1972). 
With their larger responsibilities, the lack 
of help from the media and their lack of training, African 
fieldworkers are also fewer in number relative to the 
of farmers who need their services,, Eieldworker/farmer 
ratios of 1:1000 and above, as compared with 1:500 in 
more developed countries, are the rule rather than the 
exception, and that does not take inks account that even 
within agriculture, fieldworkers are specialised so that 
the one covers only annual crops, the second only animal 
health and the third only tea. 
Given the enormous and the constraints 
facing African change agencies, they have been rather 
•slow in taking up the challenge»• The responsibility of 
promoting the use of contraceptives to slow down the 
awesome population growth is usually left to midwives 
and nurses working in clinics. Ministries of Information 
seldom play a key role and are usually more concerned 
with supporting the political system and with ensuring 
adequate newscoverage of the activities of political 
leaders than with providing the peasants, who make up 
90% of the population, with information which is useful 
to them. Schools of journalism hardly pay attention to 
agricultural journalism. Newspapers devote many 
columns to golf tournaments but very few to the-problems 
of peasantry. Provincial agricultural offices and farmers 
training centers may have an archaic stencilling machine 
or two for printing staff directives ("rockets")but 
not for supporting field staff in their operations. 
Thus the media which could be available for 
supporting the persuasive capacity of the rural change 
agency are not used0 This neglect does not so much 
reflect unwillingness to help the peasant, but is 
rather the result of a misperception of the role of 
communication in rural development. This misperception 
is evident in hundreds of instances, large quantities 
of improved cocoa seeds may be made available for 
distribution to peasants without- telling them about 
the'existence of the improved variety, let alone the 
availability of the seeds. Farmers joining settlement 
schemes may sign longterm loan contracts without being 
told about the rights and obligations of loanees in general 
or the specifics of the loan in question in particular, 
and. so on and so forth. 
Perhaps the most detrimental effect- of the 
misperception of the role of communication is 'the inefficient 
use made of the thousands of field workers who ultimately 
carry the responsibility for agricultural development. 
These fieldworkers rely virtually solely on the individual 
farm visit as their method of extension and seldom use 
group extension methods. This individual approach further 
aggravates the effects of already unfavorable fieldworker: 
farmer ratios. 
With 104 sundays and Saturdays, 12 'paydays, 10 
holidays and 30 meeting days, the average field worker 
has about 200 working days left. Out of these, at 'least 
50 go to report writing, work for superior officers and 
days when heavy rain makes field, work impossible. Of 
- 41 -
the 150 days available for fieldwork, much time is spent 
on walking long distances to reach farmers. In all, it 
is probably optimistic to estimate that the fieldworker 
intensively visits with an average of only 5 farmers on 
a day, making a total of 750 visits a year. 
Given areas with sometimes thousands of farmers, 
the fieldworker has to make a choice. And the choice 
logically falls on the larger, progressive farmers on 
whom visits have most impact. Such farmers cannot be 
visited only once a year. If we assume that the field-
worker visits each of them an average of 3 times a 
year, he can have direct, regular and intensive contact 
with no more than about 250 farmers in a year, as long 
as he uses the individual approach. Even over a five-
year period the number will not be substantially different 
because the fieldworker will continue to visit the same 
farmers. A Kenyan provincial official once told the 
authors, for example, how, when he was a boy, visitors 
to his home area would always be taken to the same three 
farms. Now, 30 years later, the same three farms are 
still used to demonstrate/visitors from outside the 
progress made in the area. 
The individual approach thus leads the field-
worker to establish a regular clientele. Much of his 
time goes into maintaining the innovative enterprises 
on these clients1 farms and very little time into 
promoting innovation on other farms. The others are 
forgotten farmers. Confirmation of their existence came 
during our experiment ?/hich tried to reach them "our" 
farmers, said "we had never seem the fruits of Uhuru 
but now we;are eating them". 
If the individual approach has so many disadvantages, 
what can be a feasible alternative? What is this group 
extension method we have mentioned? 
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The method itself is very simple. Instead of 
visiting farmers individually, the field worker organises 
gatherings of groups of farmers at a school, a training 
center or under a tree. He addresses the group and the 
group discusses whatever he has proposed. Simple as it 
seems, the method has several advantages. 
One is greater coverage per unit of time. In 
our experiment, for instance we needed only 2-g- days 
to convince up to 50 farmers to grow hybrid maize and 
to teach them how to grow it. 
A second advantage is that the group approach 
allows the field worker to use properly prepared messages 
and to utilise visual aids, and even mass media 
messages, such as pamphlets, book chapters or radio, as 
in case of radio farm forums. Thus the group approach 
can greatly increase the accuracy and understanding of 
the message delivered. 
A third and very important advantage is that 
members of the group convince each other and that an 
adoption decision taken in a group usually leads to a 
much higher rate of actual adoption than is the case 
with adoption decisions taken as a result of the 
individual approach, 
As early as 1952, Lewin demonstrated this 
in an experiment. A substantially higher percent of 
housewives adopted unfamiliar foods such as horsemeat 
for their families when they had been party to a group 
decision than when they had been approached individually. 
(Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey, 1962, p 228). 
Given such advantages of group extension 
methods and given the tremendous task facing the field-
worker, it is surprising that the individual approach 
is the main tool used, by him. It is the more surprising 
if one considers that Communist China, which is rapidly 
- 43 -
turning its peasant society into a superpower, lias 
used group methods for most of its adult education 
and indoctrination. It is, for instance, largely due 
to group methods that China can claim to be the only 
country in the world which has licked its venereal disease 
problem (Newsweek, ). 
In short, the fieldworker is virtually the 
only channel through which the benefits of modern science 
presently reach the peasants. His time is a limited 
good which is unnecessarily made more limited by 
individual extension methods. It seems evident that 
group approacher could allow the fieldworker to use 
his time more effectively and efficiently. 
Let us now turn to the selectivity in the 
distribution of extension services implied in•the 
individual approach. We saw that field workers can 
seldom achieve complete coverage. They are, therefore, 
forced to allocate their time selectively and usually 
select the most progressive and larger farmers for 
a variety of reasons. Thus allocation is governed by 
the rule that those who least need it get most of it. 
This "progressive farmer strategy" has been 
rationalised by studies of the process by which 
innovations diffuse throughout a social system over 
time (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971). Such studies have 
shown that the innovation is usually adopted by a. 
very small group of highly change-prone people who hear 
of the innovation through extension (and the mass media 
in developed countries). These people are rich enough 
and have sufficient land to risk a new venture, while 
their position in the social system makes them less 
subject to the forces of tradition and social control 
working against change. 
These very innovative people are soon copied 
by a larger number of well-off notables who cannot risk 
their position in the community by adopting an innovation 
unless it seems beneficial to do so. 
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From then onwards, the innovation spreads at 
an accelerated pace, snowball fashion, largely by word-of-
mouth, until most people in the social system have adopted 
it. The last to do so are poor, unventuresome individuals 
with small farms usually referred to as "laggards". 
Thus people differ in the degree to which they are 
relatively earlier than others to adopt an innovation, i.e., 
they differ in "innovativeness" and the ones who are early 
have different characteristics from the ones who are late. 
In a nutshell,., this is the pattern of diffusion 
observed around the world. It has been documented so often 
that the pattern seems inevitable. One is told, for 
instance, that it is useless for a field worker to visit 
laggards because they will adopt last anyway and then only 
on the basis of word-of-mouth advice of fellow farmers and 
not on the basis of extension advice. 
Thus diffusion theory gives a scientific under-
pinning to the "progressive farmer strategy", according to 
which a field worker can optimise his impact by concentrating 
his efforts on the most progressive farmers who are quick 
to grasp new ideas and have the money to implement them. 
One thereby not only maximises the pay-off from 
the limited resources'available but, on top of that, the 
diffusion process will ensure that the innovation spreads 
throughout the community until all its members have adopted 
it. Thus the progressive farmer strategy will, one is 
told, not only maximize the direct impact of the field worker, 
but his indirect impact as well. 
Alas, we know it is not as simple as that. Diffusion 
theory completely neglects the consequences of the diffusion 
process on the equity of income distribution in the rural 
area. Yet we have already seen how diffusion processes do, 
in the short run, lead to decreases in the subjective viability 
of the rural area for a large proportion of its inhabitants. 
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We quoted, asMexample, the Green Revolution in Asia 
which gave rise to serious political unrest (Brown, 
1970, 770). 
In the long run, diffusion processes force 
thousands of farmers to leave their land to a point 
where only 51° of the working population can make a 
living by farming. We have tried to show that African 
.countries cannot afford to allow such processes to 
operate uncontrolled. It will be difficult enough to 
create employment for those rural youths who obtain 
sufficient education to make a bid to escape from 
peasant life, incidentally draining the rural area from 
its best intellect in doing so. No, the only hope for 
Africa's peasant areas lies, as we have repeatedly argued, 
in equitable development. 
This means that we must use diffusion theory, not 
to predict the inevitable, but to predict what would 
happen if we didn't do something about it. If our 
experiment is theoretically relevant, it is because we do 
not use diffusion theory to determine inevitable outcomes, 
but as a source of useful knowledge about the environment 
which allows us to manipulate it to a point where the 
prediction of diffusion theory will NOT become reality. 
After all, we gather knowledge not to be able to 
adapt to our environment, but to be able to control it to 
appoint where it yields outcomes we desire. And we don't 
desire the results of the diffusion process. We don't 
desire the results of the progressive farmer strategy 
which reinforce it. We don't desire the teacher who only 
teaches his best pupils in the hope that they will teach 
the rest. 
What's more, we don't believe that justice is 
served by the diffusion process or the progressive farmer 
strategy. Lateness in adoption does not seem to be the 
result of traits which must be condemmed. Instead, it 
seems that the degree of a man's innovativeness is very 
much determined by serendipity and the haphazard 
frolic of historical events. In fact, we see every 
farmer as potential!.ly able and willing to progress, 
depending on the quality of the • strategy 
with which he is approached unless that farmer lives 
in an oppressive system which has repeatedly punished 
him whenever he tried to make some progress. And it 
is such oppression which can be avoided by equitable -
development. 0 
In short, diffusion theory provides us with the 
challenge to nuffify its deterministic predictiveness. 
Which is a beautiful frase for the social scientist 
but leaves the policy maker with little alternative but 
to ask "So what?11 „ So what indeed. And that brings us 
to the core of the strategy for equitable development 
which we have proposed-
We saw that diffusion processes have inequity as 
their consequence. We also saw that Government services 
are only given to the most progressive and so reinforce 
inequity. And thus the strategy for equitable rural 
development seems obvious: to turn the scales and 
concentrate the Government services on those who lag 
behind in innovation? while leaving the development of 
the progressives in their own, very able, hands. After 
all, a good teacher not only teaches AIL his pupi-ls,. 
he also gives special attention and remedials to those 
who need it most. 
But simple as it sounds, serious problems of 
implementation can be raised. How does one give credit 
to a poor farmer with a few acres of land without destroying 
him or the revolving fund from which the credit is made 
available? How does one reach the farmer who lags 
behind? And, once one has reached him, how does one 
convince him? 
It is an empirical fact that those who are 
relatively late to adopt are not reached by as many media 
as those who are relatively early. It in not so that 
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ojae can reach the former say by radio and the latter with 
the paper. No, one can reach the early one with both 
and the late one with neither. 
It is also an empirical fact that late adopters 
are difficult to convince and that they usually only 
adopt as a result of ?/ord-«5f-mouth communication with other 
farmers. 
A third empirical fact is that there are very 
many farmers one has to reach if one follows the "non-
progressive farmer strategy" which we propose. 
The solution to the practical problems we have 
just enumerated lies, we believe, in the group extension 
approach we described before. It allows a greater number 
of farmers to be covered. It allows group memers to 
influence each other, exactly the kind of persuasion the 
late adopter needs. Finally, it requires purposeful 
selection and recruitment methods which allow the field 
worker to reach where other media fail. In case of credit, 
loans to grouped individuals may create group pressures 
and social control mechanisms which facilitate repayment 
and may obviate the need for surety. 
In short, the core of our proposed strategy for 
equitable rural development is rechanneling Government 
services to small farmers who lag behind in innovation, 
a_~rechanneling which becomes .possible through the use 
of group approaches. 
We hope that the policy maker no longer says: 
"So what?" But we expect that he will not regard our "sol-
ution" as more than a possibly feasible hypothesis - which 
it is. Until it is proto-type tested in the field, our 
proposal can only be of use to students and other 
academicians. It therefore behooves us to prove its 
feasibility. 
This book reports on our efforts to carry out base-
line research, and to develop, test and evaluate prototype 
strategies which the policy maker, with a sincere intent 
to promote equitable rural development, can replicate. 
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3C THE PURPOSE OE THIS BOOK 
1. Problem solving Research 
Most social scientists do not carry out 
problem solving research. This is not a criticism of th 
their tendency to seek "precise, elegant and quantified 
answers to trivial questions" instead of "approximate 
answers to important questions" (Reynolds, 1971, p.64). 
It is rather a criticism of their tendency to abandon 
the research task before it is completed. 
Like all science, its sooial disciplines have 
the primary function of helping tocptimise man's 
condition on this planet. Social science must, therefore, 
help to solve problems. Problem solving implies 
the performance of a sequence of necessary functions, 
which are; (l) identification and formulation of the 
problem, (2) identification of the bottlenecks which 
presumably cause the problem, (3) development and testing 
of prototype strategies which can remove the bottlenecks, 
(4) evaluation of the impact of those strategies and 
(5) large scale replication of successful strategies 
through dissemination, 
• - • -These are normal and essential steps in problem 
solving research. One recognises them, for instance, 
in - the- activities-'of agricultural researchers. They 
carry out problem'solving research because they are aware 
that only such research can produce the recommendations 
which society expects of them (Eairweather, 1967, p.29). 
Social science, on the other hand, seems to 
have completely lost sight of its duty to recommend . 
improvements over current practice based on problem 
solving research. A country like the US, with literally 
thousands of the best trained, best financed and best 
equipped social scientists, has not been able to solve 
its social problems, witness the tragic demise of 
Johnson's "Great Society", 
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Thus a recent study of the Brookings Institution 
says of US welfare programs (quoted from Newsweek, June 
26, 1972)s 
"Today the Federal Government has more money 
than know-how. The Government literally lacks the 
techniques for remaking people and conditions. Nobody 
knows what these techniques are, or whether they can 
be developed and applied, and if so, by whom. We are 
fighting wars against poverty, urban blight, against 
pollution and numerous similar adversaries. The scenarios 
of those wars sounded fine when the legislation was enacted 
and the appropriations voted. But the wars have not 
gone according to battle plans.... We have learned that 
money alone does not do'the job. But neither is the 
job likely to get done without money. We need 
experimentation to see what works, and then the financial 
muscle to apply those lessons on a broad front" (under-
lining, by us). 
The main reason for the inability of social 
science, with the possible exception of social psychology 
and economics, to contribute significantly to society 
is that it hardly considers experimentation and proto-
type testing a legitimate function (Fairweather, 1971, 
p 13 anf). 
Instead, it stops at identifying problems and, 
at its very best, at identifying manipulable bottlenecks, 
although it usually wastes much effort on the non-manipulable 
ones as well. 
Thus, the logical sequence of the problem solving 
process is not completed by social scientists. They can, 
therefore, only give the policy maker or practicioner 
some vague "implication for policy" based on studies of 
current practice, but they cannot provide tested and 
new alternatives to current practice. They therefore 
leave the policy maker or practicioner the burden of 
translating the "implications for policy" into workeable 
solutions which he is usually unable and ill-equipped 
- 50 
to do. And thus social science remains irrelevant. It 
is significant, in this respect, that the Brookings 
Institution, quoted above, does not even mention social 
scientists as people one might turn to for help in 
•solving social problems. 
Two of .us have worked for 4 years on 
a million dollar international research project which, 
when it came to writing up "implications for policy", 
proved largely useless. All we could recommend were 
such circularities as "Since we find opinion leaders 
to be important channels for transferring new ideas from 
change agents to other farmers, we recommend that change 
agents use opinion leaders, as channels" (which we had 
just found them to do already). Or we placed the policy 
maker in an impossible position with such recommendations 
as: "Since we find that the extent to which a.farmer 
adopts, innovations is closely related to the frequency 
of his contact with the extension worker, we recommend 
increasing the coverage of extension workers" (without 
indicating how this could be done). 
The saving grace of the project was its last 
phase in which experiments with such communication 
strategies as radio forums, farmers' handbooks, and 
rural newspapers were carried out (Rogers, Ascroft and 
Roling, 1971, p ). It is this phase which gave us 
a taste for the power of proto-types testing. The 
radio forums in Eastern Nigeria are apparently still 
in operation, even after the Civil War. 
With such experience as a guide, we decided 
to make an effort to provide the policy maker, not with 
vague "implications for policy", but with a tested proto-
type which improves on current practice and contributes 
to the solution of a significant social problem. The 
work reported in this book thus reflects our effort to 
carry out problem solving research. 
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Problem solving research is a systematic *-
variant of the problem solving process which underlies 
human progress. Where animals adapt to the conditions 
in their environment, man tries to adapt the environment 
to his wishes. He seeks control rather than adaptation. 
If what he gets out of life does not correspond with 
what he wants, he is faced with a problem. Since both 
gets and wants are very subject to change, man is 
usually faced with problems and spends most of his 
life in solving them. In doing so, he performs 
functions which we have dubbed the "problem solving 
process". The process consists of a S3t of rational 
and systematic procedures for reaching a subjectively 
determined objective. 
A paradigm of the basic functions of the problem 
solving process can briefly be outlined (Holing, 1970); 
SYMPTOMS j 
' i teL. v ADAPT FORMULATE PROBLEM 
ABORT DIAGNOSE PROBLEM 
/ 
ARBORT IDENTIFY SOLUTION 
ABORT" TRY ^ SOLUTION 
L ^ i ABORT EVALUATE 
/ ' 
I 
ABORT REPLICATE 
Let us now define each funtion in more detail. 
A symptom is the conscious or unconscious experience 
of a difference between gets and wants. People can 
adapt and continue to live with symptoms, or they 
can try to do something about them. Thus generations 
of villagers may bend their head to avoid a branch 
on a forest path, until someone decides to solve the 
problem and cuts the damn thing down. Similarly, a 
a Farmers' Training Center may continue for years 
to mount courses at which very few farmers attend, 
without trying to change recruitment practices, until 
someone either removes the word "Farmers'" from the 
name of the centers (adaptation) or decides to change 
recruitment practices (control). 
Thus the first step in solving the problem is 
to formulate it, to change a vague awareness of 
symptoms into a conceptually manageable sentence, 
including a clear definition of objectives (wants) 
and a clear specification of the-actual outcomes (gets). 
Problem formulation is a big hurdle in problem solving. 
Not, only is becoming aware and working up a determination 
to do something about a problem difficult, especially 
for those who have often experienced failure, but 
even with a full awareness and desire to solve a problem 
it is often difficult to clearly state objectives and 
to identify the variable one wants to change. Every 
consultant knows this and realises that the problem 
he is called in for is probably not the one which 
troubles his client. 
The next hurdle is the diagnosis, the 
identification of those factors in the environment 
which presumably cause the gets to be different from 
the wants. That is, diagnosis is the identification 
of those factors which must be manipulated to achieve 
the objective. It is in diagnosing that man's mind 
is capable of remarkable leaps. Thus a god, manipulable 
through sacrifice, may be invented as the cause of 
small pox. Frustration to achieve objectives may lead 
to the identification of scapegoats as the cause of 
all problems. The European settler may blame Africans 
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for whatever goes wrong in life, for instance., and 
a fieldworker may blame the traditionalism of his 
farmers. A very clever escape from frustration is 
to attribute the cause of one-'s problem to intrinsically 
unmanipulable forces, such as luck, fate, or, in case 
of frustrated youths, "the system". The methods of 
science are mainly geared to overcome such subjectivity 
in the diagnosis. 
The identification of environmental factors 
which presumably cause the problem allows search for 
solutions, that is, combinations of ideas and resources 
(technology) which seem suited for manipulating the 
causes of the problem. 
It is one thing to identify a cause and quite 
another to develop technology to remove' it. That is 
why " implications for policy", even if they identify 
mahipulable bottlenecks, do not help the policy maker 
very much if he is not told how to remove the bottle-
necks. Most desert tribes are quite aware that water 
is the limiting factor in their environment. But the 
building of irrigation channels requires another level 
of. civilization so that they usually create rain gods. 
Problems in searching for solutions are the 
availability of resources, ideas on how to utilise 
them, or both. It often does not help for instance 
to give credit without training or vice versa. In the 
tribal society, however, land and labour resources were 
available and only required an innovation to spark 
off the cash crop revolution. 
With a possible solution identified, the next 
hurdle becomes its small scale implementation, or trial, 
the actual effort to test the solution identified on ' 
its ability to change the environment. The focus, at 
this stage, is on how to do it, on how to got'the bugs 
out. It is the stage which requires instruction rather 
thah- persuasion or explanation. 
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Evaluation of -the small scale trial is the proof 
of the pudding. Evaluation allows one to obtain feed-
back- on the extent to which the implementation of the 
treatment reached the objectives. A difficulty in 
evaluation is measurement. One reason for the - problems 
in promoting preventive medicine as a solution to 
prchlems is, for instance, the fact that their effect 
is difficult to demonstrate. How doe-s one show what 
the baby would have looked like without proper nutrition? 
If the evaluation demonstrates the utility 
of the treatment, it can be replicated by others, .ox--
when the same problem occurs again. The tested treatment 
then becomes part of the arsenal- of available technologies 
-untill better methods are developed for reaching the 
same objective. The problem at the replication stage 
is dissemination. One of the main challenges facing 
developing countries is to disseminate existing solutions 
to those who have the problems. 
It is obvious from the above discussion that 
the functions of the problem solving process underlie 
a great variety of human behaviors. The use of medical 
jargcnis no accident, for instance. But one can reognise 
the functions also in a TV advertisement for toothpaste. 
The camera focusses on a girl who sulks alon.e while her 
friends are dancing in the background. Her problem: she 
is a wallflower - and who wants to be unpopular? The 
next shot shows her girlfriend in the role of fieldworker. 
She says: "My dear, you have bad breath" and thus 
diagnoses the problem. The girlfriend also shows the 
technology to remove the bottleneck: toothpaste X. The 
last shot shows evaluation: the happy girl surrounded 
'by males'"burning with desire. And the message is: 
viewer, go and replicate, buy toothpaste X. 
Although,our treatment of the problem solving 
process and toothpaste advertisements seems to suggest 
that problem solving follows logical steps, this 
often not the case, Many problems are solved through 
serendipidity, the accidental stumble on a solution by 
someone able to recognise it as such. One can safely 
assume, for instance, that the use of cowdung to 
fertilise fields was not developed after painstaking 
diagnosis etc, but resulted from the observation that 
the grass grew greener around last month's droppings. 
Other irregularities also mitigate against the 
stepwise conception. There is no doubt, for instance, 
that the availability of a solution may lead to 
determination to go and do something about a problem 
or even to a change of wants. 
We therefore speak of the functions of the problem 
solving process, although prolien solving research, its 
systematic variant, dce-s follow a more stepwise sequence. 
Coming now to problem solving research, we 
must differentiate between the type which focusses on 
identifying the cause that fits a technique in the 
arsenal or the medicine cupboard, and the type which 
focusses on developing an, as yet unknown, solution 
to a given problem. It is the latter focus which serves the 
purposes of this book* 
The functions of problem solving research 
correspond closely to those of the more general process. 
Problem formulation in research usually departs jrom 
a given societal problem or policy objective and aims 
at the identification of the variable of which one 
wants to change the value. This variable is usually 
called the "dependent variable"0 In our case, the 
societal problem is rural inequity and our dependent 
variable could thus be the degree of equity in a given 
rural area. However, we have narrowed that variable 
down to the income level of peasants with below average 
incomes,, We further assumed that income depends- on 
agricultural productivity and that it, in turn, depends 
on the extent to which modern agricultural technology 
is used on the farm. Thus the variable of which we 
want to change the value is the extent .to which modern 
agricultural technology is utilised by farmers with 
below average incomes. 
The next step in problem solving research is 
the baseline study. It has the function of (l) providing 
the "before measure" of the variable one wants to change 
and (2) of identifying the independent variables, that 
is, those one must manipulate to change the value.of 
the dependent variable. In our case, the main independent 
variables are the access of low income farmers to 
different Government services such as credit and. 
extension, and the form in which those services are 
given. 
In the experimental treatment one actually engage 
in activities to manipulate the independent variables. 
Of course, one must, ideally, design the experiment in 
such a way that one can attribute observed changes in 
the value of the dependent variable directly to the 
treatment one has applied. That is, one must control 
other influences on the dependent variable which could 
raise doubts about the impact of the treatment. As we 
shall see, such control is difficult in field experiments. 
Evaluation provides the "after measure" of the 
value of the dependent variable. Comparing before and 
after measures allows one to gauge the effect of the 
treatment. Evaluation should, however, also provide a 
detailed description of the operations needed to mani-
pulate the independent variables. 
Such a description is essential for replication 
of successful- treatments. Replication implies publication 
training, or other forms of dissemination. 
Having identified our research problem earlier 
in this chapter, we shall devote the remainder of this 
book to the baseline research, the experimental treatments 
and their evaluation. The book itself is on instrument 
for promoting replication. 
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1,3,2. Chapter Outline. 
In presenting the results of the work in Tetu, 
we shall follow the sequence of steps dictated by the 
problem solving research paradigm. By and large, 
these steps reflect the evolution of the Tetu research 
programme over time. Thus Chapter 2 begins with a 
description of the research setting, not only in terms 
of the area of operation, but also with respect to the 
Special Rural Development Programme of the Kenya Government. 
SRDP provided ideal conditions for carrying out problem 
solving research - if it did'nt actually force us to 
do such research. The authors of this book were actively 
engaged in the 1972 Evaluation of the SRDP. 
The rest of Chapter 2 focusses on the baseline 
research. Although the actual field experiments were 
carried out in Tetu Division in the heart of Kikuyu 
land, baseline studies, similar to the one in Tetu, were 
carried out among the Gusii in Kisii and among the 
Abaluhya in Yihiga. We report the results of these 
studies also to allow comparison across different 
tribal regions and to show that the experimental work 
carried out in Tetu has relevance for other areas as 
well. 
The baseline studies in the three areas focus 
on the differences between small-holders in the degree 
to which they adopt innovations, and on the reasons for 
those differences. These original baselines led to a 
number of related follow-up studies. We report the 
results of a few of themj, the role of extension workers 
in Tetu, the marketing of agricultural inputs in Tetu 
and the characteristics of pioneer coffee growers in 
Kisii. 
The Chapter continues with a detailed report on 
a 1973 panel study carried out in Tetu with the same 
sample as the one used in the original 1970 baseline. 
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The purpose of the panel study is not only to acquire 
more detailed information about independent variables 
which proved important after the analysis of the 
original baseline results, but especially -to specify 
trends of change from the comparison of the 1970 and 
1973 data. We were especially interested in the trends 
in equityo 
Chapter 2 concludes•with an attempt to identify 
the dependent variable which seems beneficial to change 
and the independent variables which can probably best 
be manipulated to achieve the desired change in the 
dependent variable. 
Chapter 3 summarises the conceptual framework 
we used to determine and develop the experimental treat-
ment which could be applied to manipulate the independent 
variables. Earlier, we had occasion to observe that 
correct diagnosis does not immediately lead to effective 
treatment. It behooves us, therefore, to report on the 
considerations which guided us in identifying the 
treatment used. 
Our conceptual guide was, of course, very much 
determined by the manner in which we were brainwashed. 
If we had been economists, we would have had a completely 
different point of departure. As it is, we especially 
considered disseminative communicatioi} supported by 
credit to make adoption of what was disseminated feasible. 
Our results seem to show that we were not mistaken in 
our assumptions. 
To assume, it is said, means making an ass out 
of u and me. But since only fresh assumptions can break 
the stranglehold of convention, being one ass .seemfed 
preferable to the morass of more-of'-the-same„ And our 
preference seems, as said, to have paid off. 
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Chapter 4 reports on the experimental strategy 
itself. First we deal with the process through which 
the strategy was identified, developed and planned for 
implementation. In the second section of the chapter, 
we describe the implementation history with all its 
ups and downs. 
The strategy was implemented once in 1972 and 
twice in 1973. In the first trial, we emphasised 
dissemination through group extension. In the second 
trial, we emphasised the supportive credit package and 
methods for selecting forgotten farmers. In the third 
trial, we emphasised combining the lessons learned in 
the first two into a proto-type which can be replicated 
in small-holder areas by field staff with local resources. 
Chapter 5 reports on the evaluation of the experiment. 
First, we deal with some methodological problems of 
evaluating field experiments in general and ours in 
particular. In the second part of the chapter, we 
scrutinise different aspects of the experiment itself, 
such as (l) farmer selection and recruitment for group 
extension; (2) the extent to which the forgotten farmer 
was actually reached; (3) the extent to which his 
adoption decisions were influenced and (4) the maize 
yields and repayment rates achieved. We further make 
a non-professional attempt at cost/benefit analysis. 
Finally, we scrutinise the effect of the experiment on 
rural equity, for that is the variable we tried to 
change. 
After its two years of operation, the Tetu project 
is. still far from complete. Many improvements and 
complementary strategies can be identified for further 
testing. We propose some of them in Chapter 6, such as 
more efficient ways of field worker deployment and 
alternative group extension methods. In Chapter 6, we 
also deal in some detail with a more efficient national 
system for proto-type testing and for disseminating 
improvements over current practice in rural development. 
Chapter 7 presents the product of the work in 
Tetu; the policy recommendations which can he justified 
by its results* The harassed policy maker should read 
only this chapter. The other chapters describe how 
we got to the recommendations and show what action Bhould 
be undertaken to implement themc These chapters are, 
therefore, more relevant for practitioners and for 
advisors to policy makers who carry the burden of 
keeping the gate - admitting what is useful and keeping 
out the junk. We hope the gatekeepers will let our 
recommendations pass. We have reported our production 
process as accurately and as honestly as we could to 
allow potential buyers to fully evaluate our product. 
Vl/e are, unfortunately not in the position.of the Kenya 
Breweries in this respect. Their product is consumed 
with abandon by people who couldn:t care less about the 
way it was produced.. All we can do is hope that someone 
will find the time to read, this work, and better still, 
get enthused to action. 
3,3. The Intended Ai^iencp^ 
A book such as the present one must serve several 
purposes. In the first place, it is intended for the 
African policy maker intent vn changing the conditions 
in rural areas from which he has escaped himself. After 
all, the main reason for writing this book is to disseminate 
our results in the hope that the prototype strategy which 
was developed in Tetu is replicated on a large scale. As 
such, the book supports our other efforts to disseminate 
the results obtained; such as the numerous papers which 
were written on Tetu and the seminar for top officials 
which we held in Nairobi towards the end of our involvement 
in the experiment, We chose the book as an additional 
form of dissemination because we' feel it might penetrate 
where other methods fail.. To increase its chances 
w 
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of doing so, we did our best to make it smooth and 
interesting to read, for as far as authors whose 
native tongue is respectively Dutch, Kikuyu and Shinyanja 
can achieve that goal. 
Apart from serving the policy maker, the book 
has other purposes as well. Since the reward structure 
in social science gives few incentives to prototype 
testers and other "e/pppied" t3^ pes, the authors, who are, 
it must be said, ambitious to make a name for themselves, 
count on the book also for purposes of recognition. Thus 
the book is a hybrid because it is also written to make 
other social scientists pat us on the back. Trying to 
please policy makers and social scientists in one book 
must necessarily mean a compromise. 
But then, the book does not address social scientists 
only for purposes of recognition. We believe we also 
have a message for them. And the message is that social 
science has to start producing policy recommendations 
based on field experimentation if it wants to become 
more relevant. In this sense, the methods we used 
represent a prototype which we want to disseminate, this 
time to social scientists - and those who fund. them. 
The third audience for this book are the institutions 
which funded and supported us, and, therefore, need to 
receive an account of our activities. In the first place, 
Government of Kenya, and especially the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning (Physical and Regional Planning 
Unit), then there is the University of Nairobi and 
especially its Institute for Development Studies of 
which we are proud members. Thirdly, we must mention 
the Netherland Foundation for Tropical Research, which 
sponsored one of the authors and paid, a substantial part 
of the research cost, amd the Agricultural University 
of Wageningen, which released the same author for two 
years. 
Fourthly? there is the Rockefeller Foundation 
and the University of Iowa who supported another of 
the authors for two years and allowed him to set the 
whole research effort in motion. We thank all of them 
and hope they are satisfied with this return to their 
investment.. 
